Background. Carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae infections are increasingly prevalent in North American hospitals. We describe an outbreak of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae containing the bla OXA-232 gene transmitted by contaminated duodenoscopes during endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography (ERCP) procedures.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have designated carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriacieae (CRE) in US healthcare settings an "urgent threat" [1] . CRE are typically resistant to β-lactam antibiotics and carry genes conferring resistance to most other antimicrobials. As a result, treatment options for infections are limited, and mortality rates are high [2] . To date, CRE infections in the United States predominantly affect patients with comorbid conditions and extensive healthcare exposure [3, 4] . In addition to causing acute infections, CRE incorporated into the human intestinal microbiota can result in long-term colonization [5, 6] . Asymptomatic carriage of CRE by patients transferred between healthcare facilities or traveling between countries has led to dissemination of CRE in the United States their its establishment as endemic pathogens in some regions [7] [8] [9] [10] .
In December 2014, a single case of CRE infection after endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography (ERCP) initiated an investigation by hospital epidemiology (patient 5). Laboratory investigations including whole-genome sequencing and laboratory-developed polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analyses, coupled with epidemiologic investigations, identified ERCP as a risk factor for infection in 9 patients with a unique bla OXA-232 carbapenemase-producing CRE strain.
TJF-180V). The procedure was complicated by a duodenal perforation. Piperacillin-tazobactam treatment was started, and the patient was taken to the operating room for repair. Her postoperative course was complicated by sepsis. Klebsiella pneumoniae bacteremia was identified on HD 5 and persisted despite the addition of imipenem on HD 7. Colistin and tigecycline were added once antimicrobial susceptibility testing revealed extensive antimicrobial resistance on HD 8 (Table 1) . There was no evidence of a leak from the surgically repaired perforation site, but multiple intra-abdominal abscesses developed, requiring drainage. Despite these interventions, K. pneumoniae bacteremia persisted, prompting eventual initiation of intravenous fosfomycin and ceftazidime-avibactam on HDs 31 and 34, respectively. The patient died of gastrointestinal bleeding and bowel and liver necrosis on HD 41.
METHODS

Case-Control Studies
Because of the clinical suspicion that case 5 may have been due to exposure to endoscopy, the first case-control study was performed to identify risk factors for CRE acquisition when patient 5 was identified. In this study, case patients were defined as patients with positive cultures for Enterobacteriaceae that were demonstrated to have either intermediate or resistant susceptibility to meropenem or imipenem during the 2014 calendar year. Patients infected with Proteus, Providencia, or Morganella species that were imipenem intermediate but meropenem susceptible were excluded. Age-and sex-matched controls who did not have cultures positive for CRE were selected randomly among patients admitted during the same time period. Risk factors were collected based on published research in this area but also concentrated heavily on exposure to medical procedures.
A second case-control study was performed to better characterize the clinical risk factors associated with the identified cluster of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae harboring the bla OXA-232 gene. In this analysis, patients whose CRE tested positive for bla were selected as case patients, and those whose CRE tested negative for bla OXA-232 were selected as controls.
Field Investigations
Investigators reviewed duodenoscope cleaning protocols and logs from the medical procedure unit twice: after the initial identification of patient 5 and after identification of the cluster of bla OXA-232 CRE cases. Duodenoscope reprocessing procedures were directly observed on both occasions, including in-room manual preclean and flush, enzymatic soak and flush, manual clean, high-level disinfection (HLD) with an automated endoscope reprocessor (AER; Custom Ultrasonics, model 83a;), forced air drying, and vertical storage in a closed cabinet in a dedicated storage room. Investigators used process checklists provided by the duodenoscope and AER manufacturers when observing cleaning processes. Visual inspection of procedural and reprocessing areas was performed.
The initial investigation was performed by the hospital epidemiology team and unit managers. The Los Angeles County Department of Public Health and representatives from Olympus and Custom Ultrasonics were present during the second investigation; during the second investigation, duodenoscopes were cultured.
Active Case Finding
All patients who underwent ERCP procedures after identification of the index procedure (3 October 2014) and before all procedures using duodenoscopes were stopped (28 January 2015) were notified of their potential exposure to CRE. Patients were offered a home testing kit containing a swab and directions for collecting a rectal swab sample, which was returned to the laboratory via overnight mail.
Laboratory Investigations
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was performed for all isolates, using the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute reference broth microdilution method on panels prepared in-house. Minimum inhibitory concentrations were interpreted using Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute break points [11] . A laboratory-developed PCR analysis for bla KPC-, bla NDM-1 , bla IMP-, bla VIM-, bla SME-, and bla OXA-48 -like carbapenemase genes [12] , was performed. A second PCR analysis, which incorporated a LunaProbe and high-resolution melt analysis (LunaProbe HRMA) was developed to detect bla OXA-232 [13] . Whole-genome sequencing was performed on an illumina MiSeq sequencer (Illumina), as described elsewhere [12, 14] .
Duodenoscopes were cultured according to the draft guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [15] , with some modifications. Specimen collected from duodenoscopes were also screened by PCR for bla by the HRMA assay. Patient-or provider-collected rectal swab samples were cultured to screen for CRE [16] .
Statistical Analysis
Case-control data were managed using REDCap software [17] . Descriptive statistics and frequency distributions for demographic and clinical characteristics were summarized for the full study sample and separately for patients with CRE versus non-CRE controls and for patients with bla OXA-232 CRE versus those with other CRE. Continuous variables were compared between groups using 2 sample t tests, and categorical variables were compared using χ 2 or Fisher exact tests, as appropriate. Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for predicting CRE and bla OXA-232 CRE were estimated using logistic regression models. Firth bias correction was used in instances of complete or quasi-complete separation. Differences were considered statistically significant at P < .05. All statistical analyses were performed using SAS software, version 9.4 (SAS Institute).
RESULTS
Field Investigations
After identification of patient 5, endoscope reprocessing procedures were evaluated through direct, detailed observations. Investigators did not find deviations from manufacturer-provided guidelines. Duodenoscope reprocessing technologists had performed yearly competencies, using checklists provided by the manufacturer. Technologists used brushes not provided by the manufacturer. All duodenoscopes were Olympus TJF-180V models <1 year old, with the exception of 1 Olympus model TJF-160F that was ultimately not implicated in the investigation. Duodenoscopes were purchased new, had not been refurbished, and were in good working order with no reported mechanical problems. All had passed leak testing successfully during each reprocessing cycle.
Case-Control Study 1: Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriacieae Versus Non-Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriacieae
All cases of CRE were plotted on an epidemic curve (Figure 1 ), which demonstrated a gradual increase in CRE cases over the year but no obvious spike. Fifty patients were identified with CRE isolated from ≥1 clinical culture in 2014. The case-control study identified multiple significant risk factors for CRE (Table 2) . ERCP was identified as the strongest risk factor, but other statistically significant risk factors were also identified, reflecting the overall higher acuity and longer hospital stays of case patients compared with controls. Molecular microbiological testing was performed to better characterize the cases and elucidate the relationship with ERCP.
Molecular Microbiology Results
Of 50 CRE isolates, 39 were available for testing by carbapenemase gene PCR. One isolate was positive for bla NDM-1 , 1 for bla SME , and 16 for bla KPC ; 21 isolates had no detectable carbapenemase gene, including the isolate from patient 5. As part of an unrelated research project, whole-genome sequencing had incidentally been performed in 1 of these 21 isolates (recovered from patient 1), which unexpectedly identified the bla OXA-232 carbapenemase gene [18] . In silico multilocus sequence typing from the whole-genome sequencing data revealed the isolate to belong to sequence type 17. This isolate tested negative for the bla OXA-48 target with the CRE PCR, owing to several nucleotide mismatches with the forward primer [18] . A LunaProbe HRMA assay was thus designed to detect the bla OXA-232 gene [18, 19] . Of the 21 CRE isolates negative by CRE PCR, 11 from 9 patients were positive for bla OXA-232 by the LunaProbe HRMA assay, including the isolate from patient 5. All CRE that harbored bla OXA-232 were sequenced and found to be K. pneumoniae of sequence type 17. Between the chromosomes of these 11 isolates, 1-11 single-nucleotide polymorphisms were identified, indicating a high level of genomic similarity. Detailed genomic analysis of these isolates is presented elsewhere [18] .
Case-Control Study 2: bla OXA-232 Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriacieae Versus Other Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriacieae
A second case-control study was performed to compare patients with bla OXA-232 CRE and those with CRE that harbored other or no carbapenemase genes (Table 3) . We identified the following risk factors for bla OXA-232 CRE infection: exposure to the medical procedure unit, upper endoscopy, ERCP, invasive respiratory tract procedure, and history of cholangiocarcinoma (Table 3 ). The bla OXA-232 CRE isolates were plotted against time and by duodenoscope serial number (Figure 2 ). The plot demonstrated that an initial patient, patient 1, had bla OXA-232 CRE isolated from bile collected via a percutaneous biliary drainage tube on 30 September 2014. This patient subsequently underwent 2 ERCP procedures, on 3 October and 29 October 2014, with duodenoscopes designated as duodenoscopes 47 and 26, respectively. Eight of the remaining 9 patients from whom bla OXA-232 CRE were isolated underwent ERCP with 1 of the implicated duodenoscopes before their positive cultures. No similar pattern was found with exposure to upper or respiratory endoscopy procedures.
One case of bla OXA-232 CRE was identified in a patient with no ERCP procedures (patient 0). Patient 0 was first positive for bla OXA-232 CRE on HD 44 (12 October 2014) but had CRE isolated from a urine culture performed in July 2014 at an outside hospital (this isolate was discarded). A review of this patient's history revealed a prolonged hospital stay in India after cerebellar stroke in May 2014. The bla OXA-232 CRE are endemic in India and rare in the United States. In addition to the early urine culture and because no other patients had recent foreign travel, it is likely that patient 0 was the initial source of the bla OXA-232 -expressing CRE at our facility. No transmission link between patient 0 and subsequent outbreak patients was identified despite an extensive investigation.
Duodenoscope Cultures
Cultures were performed twice on all duodenoscopes, approximately 1 and 2 weeks after their last use. Cultures yielded no gram-negative bacteria and only 1 or 2 colonies of coagulase negative Staphylococcus. Similarly, results of LunaProbe HRMA performed on swab samples collected from the duodenoscopes were negative for the bla OXA-232 gene.
Despite negative duodenoscope cultures, investigators, in consultation with the local department of public health, believed that the combination of molecular testing and case control studies clearly established the 2 implicated duodenoscopes as the source of the outbreak. Alternative causes were investigated but were dismissed based on the observed pattern of infections.
Active Case Finding
A total of 179 patients who underwent ERCP between 3 October 2014 and 28 January 2015 were contacted and offered rectal cultures to identify CRE carriage. Of these, 150 patients returned swab samples for culture and 7 tested positive for CRE, all bla OXA-232 CRE.
All 7 of these patients were exposed to duodenoscope 47 or 26, confirming the pattern of exposure. Patients who were exposed to duodenoscope 47 or 26 but tested negative for CRE were offered a second rectal surveillance test ≥1 month after their first. One additional patient was identified in this second round of testing. In 1 asymptomatic carrier, an infection caused by bla OXA-232 CRE developed, and this patient was included in the second case-control study (patient 9). No additional carriers were identified in the group of patients not exposed to duodenoscope 47 or 26. The pattern of additional patients identified further established the link between the 2 implicated duodenoscopes and CRE transmission and further excluded alternative routes of infection.
Outbreak Management
After identification of the ERCP-related outbreak of CRE, all procedures using duodenoscopes were halted. and implicated duodenoscopes were permanently removed from service. In consultation with public health authorities, reprocessing procedures were modified, and all duodenoscopes and linear echoendoscopes are sent off site for ethylene oxide gas sterilization after each manual cleaning and HLD. Additional duodenoscopes were purchased owing to the increased turnaround time of the new reprocessing regime. All reprocessing staff repeated competencies on both the endoscopes and AER. Weekly observations of duodenoscope processing are performed by UCLA infection prevention, nursing, and quality management staff. In the 24 months since restarting ERCP, no additional ERCP-related infections due to bla OXA-232 containing CRE have been identified.
Patient Outcomes
One year after the outbreak was identified and arrested, 6 of the 9 patients with CRE infections had died, although only 2 deaths were attributable to CRE infections. The other 3 patient deaths were due to underlying medical problems (cancer in all 3 patients and liver failure in 1). One colonized patient died of cancer. In another colonized patient an abdominal abscess subsequently developed, and this patient was reclassified as a case patient; no other colonized patients had CRE infections within the year after they were identified as carriers.
DISCUSSION
In total, 9 patients were identified as actively infected with the outbreak bla OXA-232 CRE strain, and 7 asymptomatic carriers were found. We and other institutions in the United States [19] [20] [21] and Europe that have experienced similar outbreaks have demonstrated that a single endoscope can transmit drug-resistant organisms to patients over an extended period time despite adherence to recommended disinfection practices.
It has become increasingly clear that adherence to Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved manufacturer cleaning guidelines does not eradicate bacteria from duodenoscopes. Senate and FDA reports from 2016 have identified at least 41 known outbreaks involving >350 patients [20, 21] associated with ERCP. Improved surveillance of adverse events after ERCP, specifically postprocedure infections, is needed to recognize the true extent of transmission via these devices. Review of positive blood cultures after ERCP [22] or adaption of surveillance methods such as currently used for surgical site infections [23] may improve detection of infections.
There are concerns that duodenoscope-related infections may be underestimated. Most hospitals do not perform postprocedure surveillance for infections and would not be able to identify an outbreak from baseline postprocedural infection rates [24] . Reports of outbreaks due to CRE probably predominate largely because these organisms are flagged for additional investigation by hospital laboratories. However, clusters due to susceptible bacteria may be missed. Even if a cluster is identified, most clinical laboratories discard bacterial isolates shortly after test results are reported and therefore lack the ability to further characterize these isolates for clonality.
At our institution, identification of the outbreak source was possible due to routine storage and genotyping of CRE isolates as part of ongoing research protocols. Similarly, the outbreaks of CRE in Seattle [25] and Illinois [26] were identified largely owing to microbiology studies characterizing local CRE strains that incidentally identified the outbreak clusters. Without molecular data establishing the presence of point-source clusters, clinical epidemiologists may find it difficult to identify outbreaks amid the noise of baseline postprocedure infection rates and the increasing prevalence of CRE. These outbreaks underscore the importance of storing bacterial isolates and access to molecular diagnostic tools to perform epidemiologic analyses. It is unrealistic to expect many clinical laboratories to invest in equipment to perform technical and expensive molecular testing, such as whole-genome sequencing. However, regional reference laboratories could perform testing that may identify outbreaks currently being overlooked.
In the wake of recent outbreaks, the FDA has revalidated manufacturer cleaning processes and held public hearings to develop guidance for healthcare facilities on this issue. Prevention strategies recommended in an FDA communication issued on 4 August 2015 [27] included 4 potential supplemental actions to prevent transmission: microbiological testing, ethylene oxide sterilization, use of liquid chemical sterilant processing systems, and repeated HLD. Although these supplemental modalities have been used at other sites in the United States and elsewhere, barriers, such as availability and cost, significantly limit their widespread utility. As outbreaks recede from public attention, it is important that healthcare providers continue to improve safety margins for the reprocessing of high-risk medical devices. In addition to FDA recommendations, hospitals should ensure that existing processes for cleaning, disinfection, and dry storage are strong and may choose supplemental measures as recommended by FDA or additional steps, though still controversial in the research literature, such as real-time manual cleaning validation with measurement of adenosine triphosphate, protein, or hemoglobin [28] [29] [30] [31] and the use of automated endoscope cleaners [32] [33] [34] . However, we and some others [35] believe that the solution to this problem is to move to routine sterilization for duodenoscopes.
The decades-old Spaulding Classification [36] recommended HLD for endoscopes, which can leave some residual bacterial spores on devices. Sterilization offers a higher level of bacterial killing and probably an improved safety profile compared with HLD, but it can damage sensitive endoscopes. However, the use of HLD in the Spaulding classification is predicated on outmoded beliefs that duodenoscopy-related infections are due to translocation of the patient's endogenous flora. As the outbreak we describe demonstrates, however, modern duodenoscopes, which are increasingly complex and difficult to clean, can be vectors of infections between patients. Multiple studies demonstrate residual contamination of endoscopes after HLD [37] [38] [39] . In our opinion, the complexity of modern duodenoscopes necessitates the classification of these devices as "critical" and should require sterilization. Unfortunately, the majority of contemporary AERs do not perform sterilization.
Although the FDA and manufacturers have revalidated cleaning steps, it is our opinion that the long-term solution remains unknown. Healthcare providers should be wary of relying on new processes that do not differ significantly from prior disinfection paradigms and should urge the FDA and manufacturers to provide additional options for sterilization. In the meantime, additional measures should be considered, such as performing routine endoscope cleaning validation, surveillance for postprocedure infections, and ensuring that scopes are stored completely dry. Clinical laboratories can help by storing unusual bacterial isolates and should either invest in molecular typing tools or partner with reference laboratories to perform such testing, thereby possessing the capability to establish bacterial genetic relatedness and identify outbreaks rapidly. 
